

An Automated Planning Approach for Generating Argument Dialogue Strategies

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Overview

1 Background

- Persuasion Dialogues
- Classical Planning
- Planning a Dialogue
- Policies


2 Planning Argument Strategies

- Simple Strategies vs Policies
- Generating a Policy from Simple Strategies

3 Future Work

Persuasion Dialogues

- Agents have conflicting views on a topic
- Proponent's goal: convince opponent to accept the topic
- Dialogue terminates when the opponent accepts the topic or when neither agent asserts any more arguments



Argument Strategies

Existing work

- AI Planning approach for *simple persuasion dialogues* [Black et al., 2014]
- Mixed Observable Markov Decision Processes, assumes probabilistic knowledge of opponent strategy [Hadoux et al., 2015]
- Minimax algorithm [Rienstra et al., 2013]

Classical Planning

A classical planning problem consists of

- a set of state variables
- a set of actions defined by preconditions and effects
- a start state
- a goal state

Persuasion Dialogues as Planning Problems

[Black et al., 2014]

- a set of state variables
 - ↳ different dialogue states
- a set of actions defined by preconditions and effects
 - ↳ asserting arguments
- a start state
 - ↳ initial knowledge of proponent and opponent
- a goal state
 - ↳ topic is acceptable to the opponent

Planning a Dialogue

Opponent models


$$M_0 = \{B\}$$

$$M_1 = \{C\}$$

$$M_2 = \{B, C\}$$

Simple strategy


$$\{A, D\}, \{E\}$$



Policies

A policy is a set of state-action-pairs that determines which action should be performed in which state

Simple Strategies vs Policies



Opponent models

$$M_0 = \{B_0\} : 0.3$$

$$M_1 = \{B_1\} : 0.5$$


$$M_2 = \{B_2\} : 0.2$$

Simple strategy

$$\{A, C_1\}, \{C_0\}$$

$$p = 0.8$$

Simple Strategies vs Policies



Opponent models

$$M_0 = \{B_0\} : 0.3$$

$$M_1 = \{B_1\} : 0.5$$

$$M_2 = \{B_2\} : 0.2$$

Policy

$$(s_0, a_A)$$


$$(s_{B_0}, a_{C_0})$$

$$(s_{B_1}, a_{C_1})$$

$$(s_{B_2}, a_{C_2})$$

$$p = 1$$

Generating a Policy from Simple Strategies



Finding a Simple Strategy

Opponent models

$$M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} : 1/3$$


$$M_1 = \{B_2, B_4\} : 1/3$$

$$M_2 = \{B_1, B_3\} : 1/3$$

Simple strategy π_0

$$\{A, C_0, C_2\}, \{C_4\}$$

$$p = 2/3$$




Generating a Policy

Opponent models

$$\begin{array}{l}
 M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} \\
 M_1 = \{B_2, B_4\} \\
 M_2 = \{B_1, B_3\}
 \end{array}
 \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} M_0 \\ M_1 \\ M_2 \end{array}} \right\} \pi_0$$

$$\left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} M_0 \\ M_1 \\ M_2 \end{array}} \right\} ?$$



Replanning for Failed Cases

Opponent models

$$M_0 \equiv \{B_0, B_2\} : 1/3$$

$$M_1 \equiv \{B_2, B_4\} : 1/3$$


$$M_2 \equiv \{B_1, B_3\} : 1$$

Simple strategy π_1

$$\{A, C_1, C_3\}$$

$$p = 1$$

- Merge simple strategies into policy




Merging Simple Strategies into a Policy

Opponent models


$$\begin{array}{l}
 M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} \\
 M_1 = \{B_2, B_4\} \\
 M_2 = \{B_1, B_3\}
 \end{array}
 \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} M_0 \\ M_1 \\ M_2 \end{array}} \right\}
 \begin{array}{l}
 \pi_0 = \{A, C_0, C_2\}, \{C_4\} \\
 \pi_1 = \{A, C_1, C_3\}
 \end{array}$$

Policy

$$\begin{array}{l}
 (s_0, \{a_A\}) \\
 (s_{B_0}, \pi_0) \\
 (s_{B_1}, \pi_1) \\
 (s_{B_2}, \pi_0) \\
 (s_{B_3}, \pi_1) \\
 (s_{B_4}, \pi_0) \\
 \rho = 1
 \end{array}$$



Generating a Policy from Simple Strategies



Finding a Simple Strategy

Opponent models

$$M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} : 0.25$$

$$M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} : 0.25$$


$$M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} : 0.25$$

$$M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} : 0.25$$

Simple strategy π_0

$$\{A, C_0, C_2\}, \{C_1\}$$

$$p = 0.75$$




Generating a Policy

Opponent models

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} \\ M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} \\ M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} \\ M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} \end{array} \right\} \pi_0$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} ?$$



Finding more Simple Strategies

Opponent models

$$M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} : 0.25$$

$$M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} : 1/3$$


$$M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} : 1/3$$

$$M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} : 1/3$$

Simple strategy π_0

$$\{A, C_0, C_2\}, \{C_1\}$$

$$p = 2/3$$



Finding more Simple Strategies

Opponent models

$$M_0 \equiv \{B_0, B_2\} : 0.25$$

$$M_1 \equiv \{B_0, B_1\} : 1/3$$


$$M_2 \equiv \{B_1, B_2\} : 1/3$$

$$M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} : 1$$

Simple strategy π_1

$$\{A, C_1, C_3\}$$

$$p = 1$$




Merging Simple Strategies into a Policy

Opponent models

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} \\ M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} \\ M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} \\ M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} \end{array} \right\} \pi_0 = \{A, C_0, C_2\}, \{C_1\}$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} M_0 = \{B_0, B_2\} \\ M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} \\ M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} \\ M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} \end{array} \right\} \pi_1 = \{A, C_1, C_3\}$$




Merging Simple Strategies into a Policy

Opponent models

$$M_1 = \{B_0, B_1\} \quad \} \quad \{C_0, C_2\}$$

$$M_2 = \{B_1, B_2\} \quad \} \quad \{C_2\}$$

$$M_3 = \{B_1, B_3\} \quad \} \quad \{C_1, C_3\}$$



Future Work

- Implement this approach and perform experiments to determine both its scalability and the quality of the policies compared to the optimal
- How can we identify problems where a policy would perform better than a simple strategy?
- What is the best simple strategy to start with?
- How can we deal with more complex dialogue scenarios and opponent strategies?

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